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In the grand scheme of the law, sports occupy
their own little niche. They interact with other legal
disciplines to provide the guidance and structure on
which participants rely. However, while the sports
realm rarely, if ever, influences society to an extent
comparable to the likes of Brown v. Board of Education
or Roe v. Wade, 2 novel concepts occasionally arise
that challenge the current state of the law. Once in a
while a new development or, as in this case, an athletic
phenomenon sparks society's interest, requiring society to re-evaluate its bedrock principles to accommodate those individuals capable of achieving more than
current policy allows. Current policy prevents preparatory I players, yet to graduate high school, from
entering the National Basketball Association ("NBA").
Is society prepared to alter its present position and
allow capable high school underclassmen to exhibit
their talent in a forum that affords them wealth and
notoriety?
In 1971 Spencer Haywood successfully challenged NBA bylaw provisions that prohibited his participation in the league until four years after his high
school class graduated. 4 In the wake of Haywood's
achievement both college underclassmen and, more
recently, high school seniors have declared themselves eligible for the NBA draft in unprecedented numbers.' Today, with high school underclassmen receiving
increasing amounts of attention, we anticipate the next
and perhaps most controversial challenge to NBA eligibility. The collective bargaining agreement between
the NBA and the National Basketball Players' Associations ("NBPA") requires that one's high school
class graduate prior to becoming eligible for selection
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in the NBA draft (hereinafter referred to as the
"high school graduation rule")-facially prohibiting
high school underclassmen from entering the league. 6
This rule has stood over twenty years and is now ripe
for challenge, talented and capable preparatory players must decide whether to challenge the limitations
imposed by the collective bargaining agreement and
the NBA must realize the inevitability of such challenges.
Enter St.Vincent-St. Mary's ("SVSM's") LeBron
James who, as a 6-foot-4 high school freshman, opened
the eyes of spectators and scouts alike by leading
his high school team to a state championship. 7 By
the summer preceding his junior year, the 6-foot-7
James made himself known throughout the basketball
world with stand-out performances at the Five-Star
and ABCD basketball camps ' and by leading his team
to a narrow, one point defeat to the eventual national
high school champions. 9 He became the first sophomore named "Mr. Basketball" in Ohio's history '0 and,
after making USA Today's All-America first team, I
rumors of James' opportunity to challenge the NBA
eligibility rules ran rampant. LeBron James garnered
attention to a degree unheard of in high school athletics.
With season tickets selling for $125, SVSM
moved its home games to the University of Akron to
accommodate the ever-increasing number of spectators eager to see James compete. 2 Onlookers and
talent evaluators compliment James with comparisons
to Magic Johnson and Michael Jordan; many consider
him superior to both at this stage in their careers. 3
His coach and teammates credit James' unselfish play,
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prodigious youths lead normal lives,
perhaps James said it best: "I didn't

work this hard to be just a normal
23
kid."
This Note illustrates the legal

action necessary to secure a high
school underclassman's eligibility to
compete in the NBA.

Following

the precedent established by Spen-

combining atremendous scoring ability with an equally
impressive passing game, as central to their team's success. 14 Considered a definite first round draft choice
by most experts upon graduating in 2003, many believe
his ability warrants the first overall pick in the upcoming 2002 draft. ,1 Some go so far as to call James
"the greatest high school player ever" 6 Quite simply,
college recruiters that recognize his talent and ability
debate whether to bother pursuing him, all but conceding his destiny lies in the NBA. 17
LeBron James, the seventeen-year-old basketball phenomenon, finds himself in the midst of a difficult life decision: high school, college, or the NBA.
He is, however, still a teenager. Despite his potential
value on the basketball court he continued to play
high school football, earning recognition as an all-state
receiver. ,1 James envisions his talent as providing
him with opportunities to care for his mother. 19 He
maintains good grades and considers college a legitimate option despite the talk of his turning pro out of
high school. 20 When asked about his options, James
responded: "I do see myself (going to college)-but it
is real tempting to (turn pro), so it's kind of hard to say.
I really don't know ... when I have to cross that road,
I will." 2'

Willingly or not, LeBron James represents the
first serious threat to the current NBA prohibition
on high school underclassmen entering the league.
Whether he decides to challenge the rule ultimately
matters little, for the NBA faces an inevitable challenge. 2 At some point an equally, if not more talented
high school underclassman will spark interest in the
eyes of NBA teams and the challenge will commence.
With tennis players, golfers, other athletes and entertainers earning lucrative salaries at such young ages,
to deprive an equally talented basketball player of the
opportunity to earn a comparable living appears unfair.
Although many voice concerns as to whether such

cer Haywood in his suit against the
NBA, a case factually analogous to
the present issue, the NBA faces
an anti-trust action alleging a group
boycott in violation of Section I of the Sherman Act.
However, incorporating the high school graduation
rule into a collective bargaining agreement precludes
a straightforward antitrust analysis and necessarily
implicates the nonstatutory labor exemption. This
Note suggests that even under an analysis favorable
to the challenging preparatory player,the nonstatutory
exemption will probably shield an otherwise successful antitrust suit.
Section I addresses the legal framework on
which a challenge to the high school graduation rule
rests. It offers a brief explanation of federal antitrust
policy and discusses the application of the antitrust
laws to professional sports. The section concludes
with a discussion of pertinent legal precedent supporting a decision to challenge the high school graduation rule as encompassed in the NBA-NBPA collective bargaining agreement. Section II illustrates the
probable arguments involved in challenging the validity
of the high school graduation rule. The section first
attempts to impress upon the reader an understanding of the unique qualities an athlete must possess to
facilitate a challenge of this nature without having to
defend the suit's legitimacy. It then analyzes probable
arguments for and against subjecting the high school
graduation rule to antitrust scrutiny. On a more critical issue, it proceeds to analyze whether the nonstatutory labor exemption shields the rule from antitrust scrutiny. A discussion of the suit and its possible outcome concludes the section. Section III briefly
addresses public policy reasons in support of and
against allowing preparatory players to participate in
the NBA. The section focuses on the ability of similarly aged and talented athletes in other sports to participate at levels equal to that of the NBA.
In proceeding through this Note, keep in mind
the extraordinary talent necessary to undertake such
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a legal action without blushing; realize the legitimacy of
the athlete reinforces the legitimacy of the action.

A. Federal Antitrust Doctrine
and Its Applications
A challenge to the NBA-NBPA collective bargaining agreement necessarily implicates federal antitrust law. Consequently, a basic understanding of antitrust doctrine is required. Federal antitrust law, at its
most basic level, exists to protect economic competition from unreasonable restraints. 24 As the foundation for antitrust doctrine in the United States, the
Sherman Act 2 prohibits any contract, combination, or
conspiracy in restraint of trade.2 6 It further prohibits
monopolizing, or attempts at monopolizing, any aspect
of trade or commerce. 27 Federal courts generally utilize one of two methods when analyzing alleged antitrust violations-either a per se analysis or a Rule of
Reason analysis. 28 Under either method, the impact on
competition determines the validity of a restraint on
trade. 29 Federal antitrust policy also intersects with
federal labor policy, affording certain labor matters an
implicit, or "nonstatutory" labor exemption that recognizes the need to facilitate the collective bargaining
process. 30

I. M thods for Analyzing Antitrust

Clair-- Per se" and "Rule of Reason"

The per se analysis renders agreements or
practices with extreme anticompetitive effects "illegal
per se." 35 Such restraints violate the antitrust laws
regardless of their justification and without the in
depth analysis required under the Rule of Reason.36
Among those practices traditionally deemed "illegal
per se" are group boycotts and concerted refusals to
deal. 3 A group boycott claim arises when a party is
injured due to exclusion from a market in which it
seeks entry and when, in turn, the competition within
that market is injured by that exclusion. 3' The exclusion and subsequent injury suggest that members of
the market combined in an attempt to inhibit competition, thus contributing to practices contrary to federal
antitrust policy.39 Occasionally, certain circumstances
justify removing a group boycott or concerted refusal
to deal claim from per se analysis, subjecting it instead
to analysis under the Rule of Reason.4" In Silver v. New
York Stock Exchange, the United States Supreme Court
considered anticompetitive practices of the Exchange
in light of an applicable statutory scheme. 4 '
While the court initially recognized a per se violation
via group boycott, a federally mandated self-policing
policy compelled further inquiry under the Rule of
Reason. 42
A Rule of Reason analysis asks whether the
challenged agreement promotes or suppresses competition. 4 Unlike the rigid per se analysis, the Rule
of Reason adds substance to the Sherman Act's broad
mandate by better defining, and rendering more flexible, the Act's reach. 44 On a case-by-case basis, a
court weighs all relevant circumstances to determine

Per se and Rule of Reason
analyses both involve judging the
competitive
significance of a
restraint.3' The analyses do not con-

sider whether a policy favoring competition benefits the public interest

or the interests of industry members.32

ognize

e

In essence, a per se analysis

allows a court to determine the

legality of a recognized anticompeti-

with rega

tive practice without further inquiry.

11 Conversely, the Rule of Reason
analysis, a court's primary tool for
exists.
analyzing alleged antitrust violations,
requires a lengthy inquiry to determine if the practice at issue merely regulates and
possibly promotes competition, or if it suppresses or
destroys competition.34

-34-

whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited
for imposing unreasonable restraints on competition.
The Rule of Reason does not, however, take into
account just any "reasonable" explanation for a chal-
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lenged restraint but instead focuses on the challenged
restraint's impact on competitive conditions. 46 Relevant inquires through a Rule of Reason analysis include
facts peculiar to the business subject to the restraint,
conditions before and after imposing the restraint,
the nature of the restraint and its actual or probable
effects. " Other factors considered include the history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the
reason for adopting the particular remedy, and the
purpose or desired result.48 Although antitrust jurisprudence, as applied to professional sports, has utilized both the per se and Rule of Reason analyses,
the Rule of Reason emerged as the prevailing standard
implemented by the courts.

11.

The "Nonstatutory"
Labor Exemption

Antitrust doctrine further implicates professional sports through an implicit, or "nonstatutory"
labor exemption o applicable to the collective bargaining process commonly exercised between player organizations (labor) and team owners (management). 1
In accordance with a national labor policy favoring
"free and private collective bargaining," the nonstatutory exemption shields agreed-upon restraints concerning mandatory bargaining subjects-wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employmentfrom scrutiny under the antitrust laws if a product of
good faith bargaining.S1 The exemption promotes stability and certainty by allowing discussion or behavior
required in the collective bargaining process but otherwise forbidden or discouraged under the antitrust
laws. 11 Consequently, although baseball remains the
only professional sport with a judicially recognized
exemption from antitrust scrutiny, all professional
sports enjoy antitrust exemption with regards to mandatory collective bargaining subjects provided a bar5 4
gaining relationship exists.

B. Professional Sports Under
Federal Antitrust Law
The law affords professional sports leagues
the liberty to enact and enforce certain policies that
promote competition in their respective markets but
that would otherwise violate provisions of the Sherman Act. Although the various leagues compete against
one another for an audience and fan base, each league
essentially monopolizes its respective sport. Teams
generally compete within each league to acquire the
most talented athletes, 56 with each team seeking to
enhance its chances of winning the coveted league
championship. Consequently, the league depends on a
high level of competition among its teams to ensure a
marketable and profitable product. This need for balance and parity among teams affords the leagues latitude to implement policies that, although fostering the
desired level of competition, might otherwise contravene notions of law and equity commonly practiced in
the general marketplace. 17

1. Pro e ioral Base ball and its
Exemption froi Antitrust Scrutiny
The first applications of the antitrust laws to
professional sports occurred in the context of professional baseball and its "reserve clause". 5 8 In 1922 the
Supreme Court decided Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs (Federal Baseball) and exempted the business
of providing baseball exhibitions from the anti-trust
laws. 19 Reasoning that baseball exhibitions qualified as
"purely state affairs," it concluded that such events
did not constitute interstate commerce. 60 The Court
explained that although the leagues arranged for and
paid players to cross state lines,"their doing so is not
enough to change the character of the business ...
transport is a mere incident, not the essential thing." 61
Thirty years later, in Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.,
the Court reaffirmed its decision in
Federal Baseball to exclude professional baseball from the scope of the
uded that
antitrust laws. 62 The Toolson Court
;ering the
offered four reasons for upholding

gh school
)oycott in
i Act.
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baseball's anti-trust exemption: (I)
Congress implicitly acquiesced to
the Court's decision in Federal Baseball; (2) baseball developed over the
past thirty years under a presump-
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tion of exemption from the antitrust laws; (3) its reluctance to overrule Federal Baseball with "consequent
retroactive effect"; and (4) efforts to alter the existing
state of professional baseball under the anti-trust laws
should originate from the legislature, not the courts. 63
The Court once again reaffirmed baseball's
anti-trust exemption in Flood v. Kuhn. 64 Although the
Court recognized professional baseball as a business
engaged in interstate commerce it refused to overrule
baseball's exemption, characterizing it as an "aberration confined to baseball." 65 Reapplying its reasoning
in Toolson, the Court concluded that "Congress had no
intention of including the business of baseball within
the scope of the federal antitrust laws" 66 The latest
development in the saga of baseball's antitrust exemption is a Congressional amendment to the Clayton
Act-the Curt Flood Act of 1998.67 The Curt Flood
Act partially repealed baseball's antitrust exemption
as it applied to relations between Major League team
owners and players, affording players the opportunity
to challenge League labor practices regarding a player's ability to bargain and contract with teams of its
choice. 68 Though narrowed by statute, Major League
Baseball continues to enjoy exemption from antitrust
laws, 69 a privilege the Court consistently refused to
bestow upon other professional sports.

1. !Sub c to Antitrst

--rutiny:

<x~rg F:ootbalL, Basket'all

lo key Tennis, Golf...
While professional baseball enjoys its antitrust
exemption, all other professional sports find themselves subject to the antitrust laws. 70 The Supreme
Court refused to exempt professional boxing from
the antitrust laws in its 1955 decision, United States v.
International Boxing Club, Inc. 71 Recognizing that Federal Baseball did not hold all professional sports businesses exempt from the scope of the antitrust laws,
the Court declined to grant such an exemption to
professional boxing, preferring instead that Congress
make such sweeping decisions. 72 In United States v.
Shubert, 71 decided on the same day as International
Boxing, the Court refused to read Federal Baseball and
Toolson as authority for exempting other (theatrical)
businesses that, like baseball, require the performance
of local exhibitions. 74 Two years later the Supreme
Court decided Radovich v. National Football League 71
and concluded, consistent with its decisions in International Boxing and Shubert, that professional football did
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not enjoy immunity from the antitrust laws. 76 Since
Radovich, courts have routinely applied the antitrust
laws to professional sports including, but not limited
to, basketball, hockey, soccer, tennis, golf, bowling, and
77
horse racing.
C. Legal Precedent for
Challenging the NBA-NBPA
Collective Bargaining Agreement

1. Spencer Haywood
In 1971, Spencer Haywood changed professional basketball. Following his graduation from high
school in 1967, Haywood attended a junior college
where he played basketball and earned "All-American"
honors for the 1967-68 season. 7 After leading the
1968 United States Olympic basketball team to a gold
medal he enrolled at the University of Detroit where
he earned "All-American" honors for the 1968-69
season. 79 In 1969 he entered a contract to play professional basketball with the Denver Rockets of the
American Basketball Association ("ABA"), where he
earned recognition as "Rookie of the Year" and "Most
Valuable Player" for the 1969-70 season. 80 During
the following season a contract dispute with Denver
prompted Haywood to rescind his contract and to
subsequently sign a contract to play with the Seattle
Supersonics of the NBA. 8' The NBA Commissioner,
however, disapproved of Haywood's contract with
Seattle, on grounds that the four-year college rule precluded his eligibility, and threatened sanctions against
the Supersonics should Haywood attempt to play.82 A
preliminary injunction allowed Haywood to play pending the outcome of the litigation that followed.8 3
Prior to 1971, NBA bylaws precluded a team
from drafting an athlete until four years after his high
school class graduated.8 4 As this policy threatened his
immediate ability to play basketball, Haywood sought
a court order declaring Sections 2.05 and 6.03 of the
NBA By-Laws illegal under Section I of the Sherman
AntitrustAct.85 He alleged the sections at issue constituted a group boycott on the part of the NBA and its
teams against himself and other qualified players falling
under the terms of the disputed sections. 86 Recognizing Haywood's undisputed qualifications for performing at the NBA's requisite level of competition, 87 the
court granted partial summary judgment in favor of
Haywood, 8 finding the NBA's four-year college rule
constituted a per se violation of Section I of the Sher-
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man Act. 89
The court characterized the four-year college
rule as a concerted refusal to deal, explaining how
"the actors at one level of a trade pattern (NBA team
members) refused to deal with an actor at another
level (those ineligible under the NBA's four-year college rule)." The court proceeded to articulate three
harms resulting from such a "primary" boycott. First,
the boycott creates a victim of the person excluded
from the market in which he sought entry. 9' Second,
excluding the victim who attempted to sell his services in a market injures competition in that market.

exception." 99
The Court decided to apply a per se analysis
to the circumstances before it. 100 It concluded the
NBA policy at issue fell outside the "Silver exception"
because the League neither provided opportunity for
a hearing before excluding a player pursuant to the
four-year college rule, nor did it provide an avenue by
which a player could petition for special consideration.
'0' The court also rendered the disputed bylaw provisions overly broad, finding they not only prohibited
the signing of college players but also those individuals without interest in attending college and
those mentally or financially incapa-

ble of attending college. 102 Further,

n' cliber

the court discarded three additional
claims made by the NBA: financial

necessity, guaranteeing prospective
basketball players an opportunity to

;sociti l
lucrative

complete four-years of college, and
understanding that college athletics
provide a more efficient and less
expensive system for training young

basketball players. 03 The court ulti-

9 2Third,

by pooling their economic power the individual members of the NBA, in effect, established their
own private government.' The NBA, however, argued
against classifying the four-year college rule as a group
boycott constituting a per se restraint of trade.94 The
NBA asserted the dispute warranted Rule of Reason
analysis, thus affording it an opportunity to prove that
its policy did not unreasonably restrain trade. 95
The court explained that a Rule of Reason
analysis requires the court to embark on an economic
inquiry to determine the economic necessity of the
action at issue, to settle on a standard for weighing
the various public policy goals the NBA might allege as
justification for its policy, and to evaluate whether the
boycott was "genuinely motivated" by the purposes
given or by other reasons. 96 The court also explained
that difficulties associated with such a reasoned analysis prompted the Supreme Court to justify per se illegality for certain practices, such as group boycotts. 97
A per se approach, however, forbids potentially "necessary and desirable" economic cooperation. 98 Escaping a per se analysis, explained the court, required that
the facts at issue satisfy the requirements of the "Silver
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mately concluded that a rule precluding athletes from entering the
NBA until four-years after their high
school class graduates constituted a
group boycott in violation of Section I of the Sherman
Act. 104
The decision of the Central District of California in favor of Spencer Haywood transformed professional basketball into the game that exists today. The
NBA initially amended its draft eligibility rules, affording the requisite due process under a"hardship rule" 10
This rule allowed any player to petition for entry into
the NBA pursuant to a showing of financial necessity,
or "hardship." 106
The hardship requirement, however,
no longer exists as the NBA-NBPA collective bargaining agreement currently affords anyone whose high
school class has graduated an opportunity to enter the
draft. 107 The recent influx of college underclassmen
and high school seniors into the NBA-those enjoying
the benefits Haywood fought for-illustrates how the
decision to strike down the four-year college rule continues to influence the League. However, the current
policy of excluding high school underclassmen pursuant to the high school graduation rule, though strikingly similar to the NBA's four-year college rule, may
suffer a different fate. 108Whereas the NBA unilaterally imposed the four-year college rule through its
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bylaws, the high school graduation rule grew out of
the collective bargaining process and, despite its exclusionary effect, may enjoy protection from antitrust
scrutiny courtesy of the nonstatutory labor exemption.

11. Mackey v. NFL and Wood v. NBA:
Player Movement, College Drafts,
and Salary Caps
In 1976, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
articulated the standard for determining if the nonstatutory labor exemption shields a provision contained within a collective bargaining agreement from
antitrust scrutiny. 109 In Mackey v. NFL, a group of players filed suit against the NFL alleging the League's
enforcement of the Rozelle Rule 10 constituted an illegal combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade
because it denied players the right to contract freely
for their services. I According to the NFL, the lower
court erred in denying the Rozelle Rule immunity via
the nonstatutory exemption because the agreement
resided within a collective bargaining agreement negotiated between the League and the players union. 112
To facilitate application of the nonstatutory labor
exemption to the facts before it, the court articulated
a three-part test to determine whether relevant labor
policy prevails over federal antitrust policy. "' Under
this test, the nonstatutory exemption shields an agreement otherwise subject to antitrust scrutiny if: (I)
the restraint primarily affects only the parties to the
collective bargaining agreement; (2) the agreement at
issue concerns a mandatory subject of collective bargaining; and (3) the agreement is a product of bona
fide arms-length bargaining. '4 After applying this test
(the "Mackey test") to the circumstances in dispute,
the court concluded the Rozelle Rule did not qualify
for the nonstatutory labor exemption from antitrust
scrutiny. 1'5
The court initially concluded the Rozelle Rule
satisfied the first element of the Mackey test because
it imposed a restraint on trade
only affecting parties to the agreement. " 6 The court next determined
that it constituted a mandatory subinto the
ject of bargaining, thus satisfying the
second element of the test, finding
select tha
that restrictions on player movea mature
ment depressed player salaries. 117
However, an absence of bona fide
NBA falls
arm's-length bargaining prior to exe-

cuting the agreement at issue prompted the court
to deny application of the nonstatutory exemption
to the Rozelle Rule because it failed to satisfy element three of the Mackey test. 118 With the exemption deemed inapplicable and after concluding that it
did not serve any legitimate purpose given its overly
restrictive nature, the court employed the Rule of
Reason '19 and held the Rozelle Rule in violation of
Section I of the Sherman Act. 120
Nearly a decade later, the NBA's Philadelphia
76ers drafted Leon Wood in the first round of the
1984 college draft, tendering him a one-year contract
worth $75,000, the maximum allowed under the
NBA-NBPA collective bargaining agreement. 121Wood
rejected the offer, opting instead to challenge the collective bargaining agreement. 122 He alleged the college
draft and salary cap provisions in the agreement violated Section I of the Sherman Act because they precluded him from obtaining his full free market value. 123
He further alleged the provisions at issue did not qualify for the nonstatutory labor exemption, thus rendering antitrust scrutiny appropriate. 124 Although the
court admitted the provisions at issue injured Wood,
it concluded that both the college draft and salary cap
provisions qualified for the nonstatutory exemption,
thus shielding them from antitrust scrutiny. 121
As mentioned earlier, while the various professional leagues compete against one another for an
audience and fan base, the viability of each league ultimately depends upon participating teams performing
at highly competitive levels. 126 Maintaining a high level
of competition, however, requires parity among competing teams, a goal achieved by imposing restraints on
a player's freedom in its relative marketplace. 127 The
college draft and salary cap represent two restraints
utilized in professional sports to facilitate parity among

teams within each league.

128

In rendering its decision, the Wood court
focused on the importance of enforcing national labor
policy without fully addressing the validity of the chal-
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lenged provisions under the antitrust laws. 129 The
court warned that a successful antitrust claim by
Wood could undermine national labor policy with
consequences detrimental to all parties involved. 130 In
applying the nonstatutory labor exemption, the court
agreed with the lower court's reasoning that (I) the
provisions affected only parties to the agreement, (2)
the provisions encompass mandatory subjects of bargaining, and (3) the provisions emerged from bona fide
arms-length bargaining. 131
The lower court, in qualifying both provisions
as mandatory bargaining subjects, explained that while
the salary cap clearly influenced player salaries,the draft
limited a player's bargaining leverage with team owners
by restricting player movement. 132 By acknowledging
the disputed provisions as affecting only parties to
the agreement (players and team owners), the court
rejected Wood's argument that the provisions improperly affected parties outside the bargaining unit. 133
The court viewed the agreement as binding all current and prospective players to its terms, likening the
disputed provisions to seniority clauses and other
new-employer restrictions commonly negotiated for

in other industries. 134
The court appropriately defended the importance of national labor policy in light of Wood's challenge. The unique nature of competition within the
NBA and other professional sports leagues warrants
that certain restrictive provisions, such as a college
draft or salary cap, survive antitrust scrutiny when the
anti-competitive effects find themselves overshadowed
by pro-competitive effects necessary to the continued vitality of the leagues. 13' The nonstatutory labor
exemption further protects the level of competition
within a professional sports league by reinforcing a
preference for collectively bargained agreements that
will shield certain restrictive provisions from antitrust

scrutiny. 136
Once the NBA and NBPA agreed to incorporate a restriction denying high school underclassmen
the opportunity to avail themselves of benefits associated with participation in the NBA, a challenge to the
exclusion could no longer rely primarily on precedent
established by Denver Rockets and Haywood. Even if
a challenge to the high school graduation rule would
prevail under an antitrust analysis, the challenge lies in
reaching that stage of the contest. The nonstatutory
labor exemption presents a formidable obstacle to
any preparatory player seeking entry into the League,
lending credibility to the NBA's description of the col-
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lective bargaining agreement as an "iron-clad rule." 13
A successful antitrust challenge to the high school
graduation rule requires that a court deem the nonstatutory labor exemption inapplicable.

F3

A person residing within the United States whose high
school class has graduated shall become eligible to be
selected in an NBA Draft if he renounces his intercollegiate basketball eligibility by written notice ...38

A. Legitimacy of the Suit
As a high school junior I possessed neither the
requisite skills nor the talent to perform as a proficient recreational basketball player, let alone at the
interscholastic level or beyond. Any attempt on my
part to challenge a collectively bargained provision
that precluded my entrance into the NBA draft would
have failed because I would not have been taken seriously. But when a player of LeBron James' caliber suggests the notion of challenging the high school graduation rule, heads turn and people listen. '39 Teams
covet his talent and potential while spectators and
fans anticipate his impact on the sport of basketball.
Since Kevin Garnett entered the NBA directly from
high school as the fifth overall pick in the 1995 draft,
twenty-five high school seniors have declared themselves eligible. "0 Of those drafted, most languish in
mediocrity. 141 A few, like Garnett, Kobe Bryant, and
Tracy McGrady, however, became stars. 142
With comparisons ranging from Garnett and
Bryant to Michael Jordan and Magic Johnson, NBA
coaches, players and scouts consider James as good as,
if not better than, any player taken in the history of
the draft. 143By precluding a player of James' caliber
from entering the NBA before his high school graduation, the League and player's association not only prevent him from earning a lucrative salary,they essentially
require a high school diploma or an additional year
of "experience" to participate in the NBA. The question remains: on what basis does this line of demarcation rest? If teams relied upon talent and legitimate
potential as criteria for drafting players, James could
be training for his first NBA season today. Instead, the
collective bargaining agreement distinguishes between
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high school seniors and juniors, as if an additional year
transforms a player into a legitimate prospect. The
commentary on James suggests otherwise. 144 A typical NBA career for a "good" player ends within ten
years as younger talent replaces aging veterans, suggesting that a player's earning potential decreases when
entry into the league is delayed. ,41 A simple broken
wrist could eliminate that player's earning potential all
together.
Only a preparatory player recognized as capable of competing at the professional level should challenge the high school graduation rule. A challenge by
a player of James' stature presents a valid claim against
the high school graduation rule, worthy of careful consideration in light of applicable labor and antitrust law.
Once that person comes forth with a suit, the NBA
will prepare its defenses; first and foremost the nonstatutory labor exemption. However, the decision to
proceed with the challenge depends upon the likelihood of success under the antitrust laws. Consequently, the next step requires placing the nonstatutory exception aside in favor of determining whether
the high school graduation rule survives antitrust scrutiny.

B. The High School Graduation Rule
and Antitrust Scrutiny
Antitrust doctrine, pursuant to Section I of
the Sherman Act, prohibits any contract, combination,
or conspiracy in restraint of trade. 146 The high school
graduation rule, characterized as a group boycott or
concerted refusal to deal, violates this doctrine. 147
By implementing the high school graduation rule, the
NBA-NBPA agreement denies willing and capable preparatory players of the opportunity to avail themselves
of benefits offered by the NBA and
its market-a facial prohibition similar to the four-year college rule challenged and defeated by Spencer Hay-

ported justifications.'I Consequently a court will likely
utilize the Rule of Reason when it evaluates the high
school graduation rule.
The Rule of Reason involves a detailed analysis of all relevant circumstances to determine if the
restraint at issue unreasonably injures competition in
the relevant market. 152 The relevant market is that in
which basketball players compete for employment. "I
In that market, the NBA enjoys substantial power. 114
Application of the Rule of Reason requires analysis
focused on the challenged restraint's impact on a market's competitive conditions. "I It does not, however,
create an avenue by which judges can inject subjective policy views into their decisions. 156 Thus, after
eliminating all social, ethical, or political views from
the equation, the basic question remains whether procompetitive effects enjoyed by the NBA and its players significantly outweigh the anticompetitive nature
of the restraint that burdens preparatory players subject to the high school graduation rule. Stated another
way, does the high school graduation rule promote or
suppress competition within the NBA and its market?
The high school graduation rule clearly denies
willing and capable high school underclassmen of the
opportunity to avail themselves of benefits associated
with participation in the NBA. Furthermore, without
an alternate venue offering remotely similar benefits,
the rule denies preparatory players of any opportunity
to earn a formidable salary before their class graduates high school. From the NBA's perspective, precedent established by challenges to the college draft
and salary cap illustrates the League's legitimate business interest in maintaining a high level of competition
among its teams. "' Fulfilling that interest undoubtedly
requires the League to admit the best players possible,

wood. 48 However, unlike the court's
decision in Denver Rockets to hold
the four-year college rule in violation of the antitrust laws under a
per se analysis, 149 recent court decisions encourage analysis under the
Rule of Reason. 0SO
In the context of professional
sports, the Rule of Reason adequately considers the
need for competitive balance among teams, thereby
discouraging courts from striking restraints as illegal
per se and prompting them instead to consider pur-
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spread as evenly as possible among all teams in the
league. The high school graduation rule does not promote this interest and, if anything, contradicts it. NBA
scouts, talent evaluators, and the general public recognize at least two preparatory players-LeBron James
and Kendrick Perkins-as capable of playing profes-
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sional basketball at their current levels of ability. Dismissing talent or ability as valid reasons for excluding
such players leaves the League with arguments in
defense of the high school graduation rule geared
towards framing the NBA as a product that requires
the disputed restraint to maintain its quality and
image.
The NBA will raise a variety of arguments in
support of the high school graduation rule, only to find
each argument matched with a reasonable, and perhaps more persuasive, argument from the challenging
party. An argument by the NBA suggesting the high
school graduation rule safeguards the quality of play currently offered by the League must survive the challenger's assertion that excluded high school underclassmen perform at
skill levels comparable, if not
superior,to their
eligible senior
counterparts.
ra
u
This argument
the
mig
requires
challenging party

displayed by Smith but the Dallas Mavericks, by drafting him, assumed that risk. If a team chooses to take
on such a young player,perhaps emotional stability and
maturity deserve consideration at a level similar to
that afforded talent. The entrance of a preparatory
player into the draft does not obligate teams to select
that player, 60 and the burden of selecting a mature
player capable of performing in the NBA falls on the
selecting team. 161 If the NBA addresses concerns
regarding its image, possibly characterized as an aversion towards getting "too young," the party challenging the high school graduation rule should highlight
the current trend towards drafting players with
less experience-college underclassmen and players
directly out of high school. 162 If teams select
younger players
based on talent
and ability, age

and year in
school (and thus
experience),

other arguments
put forth by the
NBA appear of

to belittle any
"junior-senior"

minimal
relevance to the

distinction made
by the League.
NBA
If the
defends the rule
by asserting that experience gained by playing high
school basketball correlates to a player's ability to
perform among the League's established players and
to a player's ability to contribute to the League's overall quality of play, the challenger should again emphasize weaknesses in any argument attempting to distinguish high school juniors from older players of equal
abilities. The challenging party should also direct the
court's attention, by analogy, to Denver Rockets, which
explained that college athletics do not provide a basis
for antitrust exemption even if they provide a more
efficient and less expensive means for training young
professional players. 158
If the NBA raises concerns over a preparatory
player's maturity and ability to handle the rigors of an
NBA lifestyle, it will likely direct the court's attention
point to the documented outbursts of Leon Smith,
a player drafted out of high school who drew attention to himself by refusing to follow instructions at a
team practice. '19 One cannot ignore the immaturity

selection equa-
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tion. If that isthe
case, precluding

the selection of
equally talented and capable preparatory players makes
little sense. The NBA might further assert an interest
in promoting education, suggesting the importance
of earning at least a high school diploma. Though a
noble position, the challenger should again direct the
court's attention, by analogy, to Denver Rockets, which
described the NBA's interest in guaranteeing prospective basketball players the opportunity to complete
four years of college commendable but nonetheless insufficient to "override the objective of fostering economic
competition ... embodied in the antitrust laws" 163
The challengers, in response to the NBA's
assertions, want the court to characterize the high
school graduation rule as unnecessarily broad. Like
the rule struck down in Denver Rockets, the rule at
issue neither allows for exceptional circumstances nor
does it serve a purpose by way of least restrictive
means. 164 Concerning the matter of exceptional circumstances, the rule does not provide a means by
which a qualified player without any hope of graduat-
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ing can petition for entry into the draft. 165 It does
not consider financial stability or a player's economic
status. It also fails to adequately define "high school
class," a relevant consideration for instances where a
qualified player, for example, repeats a grade. Must
that player wait an additional year or may he enter
the draft at the time of his original, anticipated graduation? The rule does not offer exceptions or adequately explain its definitions; instead it creates a blanket preclusion of preparatory players from the NBA.
Furthermore, if the NBA's primary concern
remains quality of play, a system for evaluating high
school talent sufficiently serves that purpose in a less
restrictive fashion. A less restrictive restraint might
involve a scheme implemented by coaches, scouts, and
talent evaluators to "grade" preparatory players based
on their basketball abilities, accompanied by a baseline
score required for entry into the draft. Although still
a restraint, it correlates more closely with the apparent interests of the league and, similar to the draft and
salary cap, would probably withstand antitrust scrutiny.
The existence of at least one less restrictive alternative further demonstrates the excessive breadth
of the high school graduation rule. As an overly
broad restriction barring entry into a desired market,
the high school graduation rule unduly precludes a
qualified basketball player from enjoying the benefits
offered by the NBA and its market.
A policy affording qualified preparatory players
an opportunity to compete in the NBA does not suggest any foreseeable detrimental effects beyond what
the NBA currently faces. To the contrary, allowing
qualified underclassmen to enter the League adds a
level of intrigue not seen since Kevin Garnett entered
the League in 1995. The potential for drawing a wider
fan base and creating a more exciting atmosphere
suggests the possibility of more profitable marketing
schemes. Furthermore, if carefully selected, the entry
of preparatory players could create a wider and possibly stronger talent base. Ultimately, because the benefits enjoyed by the NBA do not outweigh the anticompetitive effects felt by the excluded players and by
the market in which they seek entry, the high school
graduation rule should be found to violate Section
I of the Sherman Act as a group boycott or concerted refusal to deal in restraint of trade. With a
remedy available under the antitrust laws, a successful
suit requires that plaintiffs overcome the nonstatutory
labor exemption.

C. Applicability of the Nonstatutory
Labor Exemption
The nonstatutory labor exemption promotes
collective bargaining by shielding certain agreed-upon
restraints from scrutiny under the antitrust laws. 66
Under the criteria established in Mackey, immunizing
such a restraint requires that (I) the restraint primarily affect only parties to the collective bargaining
agreement; (2) the restraint at issue concern a mandatory subject of bargaining; and (3) that the restraint
is a product of bona fide arms-length bargaining. 167 As
the college draft and salary cap disputes demonstrate,
the nonstatutory exemption imparts stability and certainty in the bargaining process by encouraging discussion of topics ordinarily forbidden under antitrust law
but that may contribute to the success of an enter-

prise. 168
The NBA characterizes the high school graduation rule as "iron-clad' 169 asserting that it fits comfortably within the nonstatutory labor exemption.
However, with a strong possibility of the restraint failing an antitrust analysis, the validity of the rule depends
upon it satisfying each of the three Mackey criteria.
The challenging party should concede the third criterion and accept the NBA-NBPA agreement as a
product of bona fide arms-length bargaining. 170 Consequently, immunity under the nonstatutory exemption depends on whether the rule satisfies the first
and second criteria, requiring the court to evaluate
whether a preparatory player constitutes a party to
the agreement and whether the high school graduation rule constitutes a mandatory bargaining subject.
Before evaluating the high school graduation
rule under the remaining Mackey criteria, the significance of the rule should be considered in light of
its potential effect on national labor policy. In Wood
v. NBA, the Second Circuit expressed concern over
allowing certain antitrust challenges to proceed when
doing so could undermine national labor policy. 171
Employers entering collective bargaining agreements
rely upon the nonstatutory exemption as an assurance
of protection from antitrust liability. 172 If an employer
cannot negotiate for provisions necessary to the survival of its market, regardless of associated anticompetitive characteristics, the incentive to engage in collective bargaining vanishes. A successful challenge by
Wood could have undermined national labor policy
because the NBA legitimately relies upon the college
draft and salary cap to ensure the viability of pro-
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fessional basketball. "I The college draft and salary
cap each warranted immunity from antitrust scrutiny
because they met the requisite criteria. The survival
of the NBA, either financially or competitively, does
not rely upon the validity of the high school graduation rule and a court should not find itself compelled
to shield a rule excluding preparatory players from the
NBA under the pretext of preserving national labor
policy.

the league. By characterizing high school underclassmen as prospective players, the NBA would argue to
include them as parties to the agreement. In response,
the challenging party should argue that until draft-eligible, a high school underclassman cannot qualify as a
party to the agreement.
The NBA-NBPA agreement effectively excludes
preparatory players from enjoying benefits of the
agreement. The argument against including high school
underclassmen as a party to the
agreement does not implicate a dis-

pute over receiving fewer benefits
than a more senior player but rather

involves a dispute over the right to
enjoy any benefits of the agreement.
Accepting the players' association as
a body that negotiates on behalf of

established and prospective players,
the challenging party should argue

that preparatory players are too far
Sforemoved from the relevant market
to justify including them as pro-

Whether the high school graduation rule,
as incorporated in NBA-NBPA collective bargaining
agreement, primarily affects only parties to the agreement represents the first of two arguments against
applying the nonstatutory labor exemption. In Wood v.
NBA, the Second Circuit viewed the collective bargaining agreement between the NBA and NBPA as binding all current and prospective players to its terms
because, as commonly practiced in other industries,
the parties negotiated benefits favoring more senior
employees. 4 Wood had neither competed in the
NBA nor had the players' association provided him, or
others similarly situated, with an avenue to voice concerns. Instead, the players association negotiated an
agreement intended to benefit all players. By entering
the NBA,Wood could, and did avail himself of those,
albeit restrictive, benefits supposedly negotiated on
his behalf. The agreement did not, however, preclude
Leon Wood's entry into the NBA.
The NBPA did not recognize LeBron James as
a member of the bargaining unit at the time it negotiated the present collective bargaining agreement,
just as it did not recognize Leon Wood as member
fifteen years earlier. Unlike Wood, whom the League
openly welcomed, a preparatory player cannot enter

spective players. A drafted player
enjoys the negotiated benefits. An
undrafted player enjoyed the opportunity to attain benefits offered to an NBA player but
fell short pursuant to some other criteria. The preparatory player never had the opportunity to enjoy
benefits supposedly negotiated on his behalf because
the NBA and NBPA decided to exclude that class of
player without considering his interest. The challenger
should therefore argue against applying the nonstatutory exemption to the high school graduation rule on
grounds that it constitutes a restraint affecting a party
outside of the bargaining relationship.
While the above discussion presents formidable, policy-based arguments against classifying preparatory players as a party to the collective bargaining
agreement, a successful challenge to that classification,
though possible, remains improbable. The argument
is built on a weak foundation without much supporting precedent. Unfortunately for the challenging party,
the amorphous nature of precedent supporting the
better-grounded argument-whether the high school
graduation rule constitutes a mandatory subject of
bargaining--does not increase the challenger's chance
of prevailing. A successful argument under this criterion requires the challenging party to either convince
the court of the rule's permissive (non-mandatory)
nature or, if unsuccessful in doing so, urge a court
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to adopt a favorable reading of Justice White's reasoning from his Jewel Tea opinion. 175 However, even if
the court adopts a favorable view of Justice White's
reasoning, the outcome ultimately depends on how a
court interprets that reasoning in light of the circumstances before it.
National labor policy requires that parties to a
collective agreement bargain in good faith on mandatory subjects of bargaining--wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment. 176 Whether an
agreement concerns a mandatory subject of bargaining depends on its practical effect, not necessarily its
form. 177 Courts have interpreted "other terms and
conditions of employment" to include safety concerns, employment security, freedom from discriminatory discharge, seniority rights, and compulsory retirement ages. 178 While removing an agreement from the
mandatory bargaining classification does not preclude
negotiation on a permissive basis, 179 it does preclude
antitrust immunity through the nonstatutory labor
exemption.
A court will likely classify the high school graduation rule as a mandatory bargaining subject because
of the provision's immediate and direct concern to the
League and NBPA members. '80 Even if the court looks
beyond the potentially remote impact of the rule on
player salaries and working hours, 181 the "other terms
and conditions" catchall would probably encompass
sufficient concerns to justify classifying the high school
graduation rule as a mandatory subject of bargaining.
The potential accommodations a preparatory player
might require, ranging from educational needs to compliance with child labor laws, and the potential consequence of younger players pushing more experienced veterans out of the league present valid concerns worthy of a court's consideration. If a court
settles on recognizing the rule as a mandatory bargaining subject, and provided the rule satisfied the other
Mackey criteria, it must then decide if the rule warrants antitrust exemption.
In Amalgamated Meat Cutters
v.Jewel Tea Co., the Supreme Court
disagreed as to whether a mandatory subject of bargaining warrants

immunity under the nonstatutory
labor exemption. 182 The prevailing
three-justice opinion, authored by
Justice White, declared agreements
involving mandatory subjects of bargaining beyond the reach of the anti-
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trust laws, explaining that "agreement on [when and
how long employees must work] between the union
and the employers in a bargaining unit is not illegal
under the Sherman Act, nor is the union's unilateral
demand for the same contract of other employers
in the industry" 183Justice White qualified his statement by suggesting that if the limitation imposed by
the agreement only remotely furthered vital interests
of the parties to the agreement or, if the imposed
limitation and purported benefit share an attenuated
relationship, the challenger presents an argument with
merit that might justify withdrawing protection of the
nonstatutory exemption. 184 He explained that where
"the obvious restraint on the product market ...
stands alone, unmitigated and unjustified by the vital
interests of the union [members] ... the limitation
imposed by the unions might well be reduced to nothing but an effort by the union to protect one group
of employers from competition by another, which is
conduct that is not exempt from the Sherman Act:" 18
Justice Goldberg, writing for three justices,
agreed with the decision of the White plurality but
strongly disagreed with Justice White's willingness to
inject an element of subjectivity into the Court's reasoning. 186 According to Justice Goldberg, the congressional intent behind the national labor policy requires
absolute immunity from antitrust scrutiny if the disputed restraint involves a mandatory subject of bargaining. 187 If a court indeed classifies the high school
graduation rule as a mandatory bargaining subject,
application of the strict Goldberg analysis defeats any
challenge to the preclusion of preparatory players
from the NBA. The more likely scenario, and the one
that should be strongly advocated by the challenging
party, indicates a court will apply the reasoning offered
by Justice White. "8
The plain language of the three criteria established in Mackey renders a mandatory subject of bargaining immune from antitrust scrutiny provided the
restraint satisfies the remaining criteria. An argument

Can'tWe PlayToo? The Legality of Excluding Preparatory Players from the NBA
suggesting the high school graduation rule falls within
the limited category of mandatory bargaining subjects
unworthy of antitrust immunity because of its failure
to address vital interests of parties to the agreement
faces a minimal chance at success. Without case law or
statutory guidance supporting such arguments against
antitrust immunity, ample opportunity exists for political, economic, and social values to influence a court's
decision as it addresses a public policy favoring collective bargaining and free competition. 189
The purported benefits likely offered by the
NBA in support of the high school graduation rulemaintaining high quality competition, minimizing potential systemic disruptions caused by younger-aged players, and protecting roster spots for veteran players-do not translate into strong defenses of the
rule. As a practical matter, the rule fails to sufficiently
address any of the League's concerns. A court should
request evidence supporting the NBA's concern that
affording preparatory players the opportunity to participate will adversely affect the League's quality of
play. Conversely, a court should require the League to
explain how graduated high school seniors, currently
the youngest class of NBA competitors, contribute
positively to the League's quality of play in a manner
that preparatory players cannot. As a court considers
the potential systemic disruptions (practice hours and
other necessary accommodations) caused by a preparatory player's entry into the League, it must also consider the "uncompelled" decision of a team to select
a player capable of causing such disruption. A court
should also request the NBA clarify its interest in
precluding qualified high school underclassmen from
entering the League despite its purported practice of
selecting players based on talent and ability. By appearance, the practical effect of the exclusion is to preserve roster spots for less talented or capable veteran
players, a practice seemingly contrary to the League's
economic interests. 190 Unless the NBA adequately
addresses the above concerns, the chance of a court
recognizing the high school graduation rule as a mandatory bargaining subject but nonetheless subject it
to antitrust scrutiny remains a possibility, even if not
a strong one. Whether the rule addresses vital interests of parties to the agreement, warranting a decision
favorable to the challenging party, remains for a court
to decide.
Addressing whether the nonstatutory labor
exemption shields the high school graduation rule
from antitrust scrutiny requires answers to a multi-
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tude of pivotal questions mostly dependent upon the
opinion of the court rather than on statute or precedent. Under the Mackey criteria, a court will likely
find that high school underclassmen constitute a
party to the agreement under the rubric of"prospective players," that the restraint at issue constitutes
a mandatory bargaining subject, and that the agreement emerged from bona fide arms-length bargaining.
Whether high school underclassmen actually constitute a party to the agreement remains a valid point
of contention, but the absence of strong supporting
precedent renders the argument against weak. Given
a court's probable agreement with the NBA's classification of the high school graduation rule as a mandatory bargaining subject, the challenging party's best
chance at success requires that it persuade the court
to adopt an extremely favorable reading of Justice
White's reasoning in Jewel Tea. Although potentially
successful, an outcome favorable to the challenging
party remains unlikely. Furthermore, while an outcome favorable to the challenging party will not subvert principles underlying the preference for collectively bargained agreements espoused by the national
labor policy, the Supreme Court recently suggested in
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. that it strongly advocates the
protection of collectively bargained restraints from
antitrust scrutiny. 191 In light of the Supreme Court's
apparent position, the nonstatutory labor exemption
will presumably shield the high school graduation rule
from antitrust scrutiny.

D. Probable Outcome of the Suit
Any preparatory player with skills and abilities
comparable to those of LeBron James enjoys a chance,
however slim, of defeating the provision of the NBANBPA collective bargaining agreement that precludes
entry into the League until after one's high school class
graduates. A straightforward antitrust analysis under
the Rule of Reason would likely prompt a court to
hold the high school graduation rule in violation of
Section I of the Sherman Act. As a group boycott or
concerted refusal to deal, a court would find the procompetitive benefits enjoyed by the NBA and player's
association substantially outweighed by the rule's pronounced anticompetitive effects on the market. However, a court would also likely find the rule fits within
each of the Mackey criteria, thus shielding it from antitrust scrutiny via the nonstatutory labor exemption.
Although satisfaction of the Mackey criteria does
not guarantee the rule's immunity, even a favorable
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interpretation of Justice White's Jewel Tea reasoning
might prove insufficient to overcome the apparently
strong preference for shielding collectively bargained
restraints from antitrust scrutiny. Consequently, while
predicting the actual outcome of a challenge to the
high school graduation rule is impossible, and although
the rule appears "iron clad" in light of the court's
probable conclusion, the existence of reasonable arguments against the validity of the high school graduation rule suggests that it is not impenetrable.

Can a seventeen-year-old high school student
play in the NBA? From a legal and moral perspective,
a plethora of arguments rebuke such an idea. 192 Realistically, a person can imagine a preparatory athlete
capable of performing at such a high level. The NBA
currently relies on its collective bargaining agreement
to preclude high school underclassmen from entering
the League. Other professional sports enforce similar policies designed to deny athletes below a certain
age or grade-level entry into their ranks. "1 However,
the stigma against encouraging or allowing preparatory athletes from participating in professional sports
leagues runs contrary to the general acceptance of
similarly aged athletes competing in other sports.
Athletes of high school age and younger consistently earn recognition, whether through accomplishment or advertisement, in their respective sports. The
PGA recently welcomed seventeen-year-old TyTryon, a
high school junior,onto the PGATour in 2001.19' After
beginning a tumultuous professional career at age
thirteen, Jennifer Capriati finally achieved the Women's Tennis Association's number one ranking at age
twenty-three in 2001. 19 While Tara Lipinski became
the youngest World Figure Skating Champion at age
fourteen in 1997, 196 Dominique Moceanu, the youngest member of the 1996 United States gold medal
Olympic team, began training at age three. 197 Perhaps
more striking than the above examples is the story
of Freddy Adu. In 200 1, a premier Italian soccer club
offered $ 750,000 for the rights to Adu, a U.S. resident
and (then) twelve-year-old soccer prodigy. 198 These
athletes, among the best at their respective sports,
earned the right, wisely or not, to profit from their talents at early ages. Even the entertainment industry,
which employs children as young as the newly born,

affords opportunities to earn a living such young ages.
The physical and mental demands of professional athletics may warrant an age-related barrier, but
the means for establishing such a barrier do not exist
outside of arbitrary application. 199 Nonetheless, while
one cannot predict with absolute certainty how preparatory athletes will adjust to professional athletics,
an athlete such as LeBron James, universally regarded
as mature and capable of making an immediate impact
on the NBA,2 °0 cannot be justifiably denied the opportunity to profit from his abilities.

LeBron James did not enter the NBA draft this
year, allowing advocates of age limits time to breathe
more freely. 20' Perhaps he made the correct decision
by not challenging the eligibility rule.20 2 In response
to his decision not to challenge the collective bargaining agreement, James' mother explained:"You can't get
[high school] back... [the NBA] wants him now;they'll
want him after he's done with high school" 203 One
cannot help but wonder if James and his mother feel
the same after James, who months earlier saw his picture on the cover of Sports Illustrated, 20 4 suffered a
broken wrist during a summer league game . 205 Fortunately, he broke the wrist attached to his non-shooting
hand. Consequently, with the risk of further injury too
great, the SVSM football team will compete without
their all-state receiver this year.
Within the next year, LeBron James will probably
become the most touted NBA rookie ever. It would
be a shame to see such immense talent go unrewarded
due to an injury. What could anyone say to an athlete
once regarded as potentially the best ever and worth
millions but whom now has nothing because of an
injury? Why force a capable athlete to risk such tragedy?
While a basketball player of James' caliber only asks for
an opportunity to display his talent before the world,
teams face no obligation to select such a player. 206 However, current policy dictates that preparatory players
must wait until the NBA or some higher body allows
them to compete.
A resolution to this matter in accord with fairness may reside outside of the courtroom as constant pressure by advocates, or perhaps even time
itself, may eventually secure a qualified preparatory
player's eligibility to compete in the NBA. However,
a direct challenge to the high school graduation rule
might remain the most practical method for stimulat-
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ing change. LeBron James, on the subject of challenging the high school graduation rule, may have said it
best:"Eventually a junior is going to do it. It might be

me. It might not. 207
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watching high school basketball players and running
all-star games, he is the best player I have ever seen
at his age"); Francis, supra note 13 (quoting Mark Mayemura of recruitingusa.com: "It's not even an opinion
...it's a fact that he's the number-one player in high
school basketball. He may possibly be the best player
in a decade, along with Kevin Garnett. We may be talking about the player of a lifetime.").
17 See

Bell, supra note 13 (quoting recruiting analyst

Bob Gibbons: "College coaches are resigned to the
fact that he will go to the NBA."). See also Bob Baptist, OSU shouldn't Ignore James, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
Nov. II, 2001 at 13D ("Many wonder ...
whether the
[Ohio State University] Buckeyes should spend time
recruiting a phenom who most believe will be the first
Ohioan to jump from high school to the NBA:").
18

See Garcia, supra note 14. However, a broken wrist

suffered this past summer will probably end his football career. See Eric Prisbell, King James: High School
Basketball Sensation LeBron James is Keeping his Options
Open as He Nears a Multimillion Dollar Payday, THE
FRESNO BEE, July 12, 2002, at D I.
9[My

mother and I] never lived in a house. We've
always lived from apartment to apartment. I always
told [my mother] I'd buy her a new house." See Saraceno, supra note 12 (quoting James).
20

Although James only needs a qualifying standardized

test score to attend what could be the college of his
choice, few expect him to enroll. See Francis, supra
note 13; see also Lilly, supra note 13 (quoting an assistant coach in the Big East school as to why few schools
have spent time and effort to seriously recruit James:
"There's no way he's going to college ...everyone
knows it .... He could be a top-five N.B.A. selection
right now. Why would he go to school?"). James lists
Duke, North Carolina, Ohio State, Florida and Louisville as schools of interest. See Prisbell, supra note 18;
see also Baptist, supra note 17 (quoting SVSM basketball coach Dru James:"[Colleges] need to recruit him
...They need to make sure he knows they're interested:").
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21

See Saraceno, supra note 12.

22 ,"Eventually

a junior is going to do it. It might be me.

It might not." See Doyel, supra note 8 (quoting LeBron
James).
23
24

See Francis, supra note 13 (quoting LeBron James).
See N.C.A.A. v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98

(1984); see also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 22 I
U.S. I, 58 (1911) ("[T]he dread of enhancement of
prices and of other wrongs which ... would flow from
the undue limitation on competitive conditions caused
by contracts or other acts of individuals or corporations led, as a matter of public policy, to the prohibition or treating as illegal all contracts or acts which
were unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions . .
25

See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ I-7 (2000) (Sherman Anti-

Trust Act); see also generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2000)
(Clayton Anti-Trust Act).

States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)); id. at 109, n. 39
("[T]he rule of reason can sometimes be applied in a
the twinkling of an eye"). This Note confines its analysis to the per se and more detailed Rule of Reason
analyses.
29

See N.C.A.A., 468 U.S. at 103 ("Both per se rules and

the Rule of Reason are employed 'to form a judgment
about the competitive significance of the restraint')
(quoting Prof'l Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692); see also id. at
104 ("Under the Sherman Act the criterion to be used
in judging the validity of a restraint on trade is its
impact on competition").
See generally THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 2272-98
(Patrick Hardin & John E. Higgins, Jr. eds., 4th ed.
2002) (discussing the "statutory" and "nonstatutory"
labor exemptions); Kieran M. Corcoran, When Does
the Buzzer Sound?: The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption
30

in Professional Sports, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1045, 1047-78

(1994).
31See

26

See 15 U.S.C. § I (in pertinent part:"Every contract,

combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States ... is hereby declared to be illegal").

Nat'l Soc'y of Pro'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435
U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
32

See id.

who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States ... shall be deemed
guilty of a felony ... ").

See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST
POLICY § 5.6b (2d ed. 1999); see also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v.
United States, 356 U.S. I, 5 (1958) (stating: "[C]ertain
agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming
virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable
and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry ...
").

28 A

34

33
27

See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (in pertinent part: "Every person

third method for analyzing antitrust claims - an
abbreviated or "quick-look" analysis under the Rule
of Reason - developed out of recent case law, creating a middle-ground between per se and Rule of
Reason analyses. The "quick-look" analysis is appropriate where "an observer with even a rudimentary
understanding of economics could conclude that the
arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets." See Cal. Dental
Ass'n v. Fed.Trade Comm'n, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).
See also N.C.A.A., 486 U.S. at 109 (stating that agreements not to compete in terms of price or output
do not require elaborate industry analysis to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such agreements) (citing Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United

See Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States,
246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
31

See N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5.

See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692 (agreements are per se illegal only if their "nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their
illegality"); see also N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5.
36

See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359
U.S. 207, 212 (I 959) ("Group boycotts, or concerted
refusals by traders to deal with other traders, have
long been held to be in the forbidden category ...

37

-49--

SPORTS
[because] ...such agreements ...cripple the freedom
of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in
accordance with their own judgment") (internal quotations omitted); see also Fashion Originators' Guild of
America v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457, 467-68
(I 94 1) (finding that petitioner's combination intended
to injure competing garment manufacturers and retailers, the Court upheld the lower courts refusal to
hear evidence concerning the reasonableness of the
restraint). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
adopted "an agreement by two or more persons not
to do business with other individuals, or to do business with them only on specified terms" as its definition of "concerted refusal to deal" See Mackey v. NFL,
543 F.2d 606, 618 (8th Cir. 1976). It adopted "a refusal
to deal or an inducement of others not to deal or to
have business relations with tradesman" as its definition of "group boycott." Id.
38

See Fashion Originators' Guild, 312 U.S. at 465.

42

See Silver, 373 U.S. at 347-49.

43

See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 691.

See id. at 688. But see Denver Rockets, 325 F Supp. at
1063 (discussing disadvantages to Rule of Reason analysis: "it requires difficult and lengthy factual inquires
and very subjective policy decisions which are ...
essentially legislative and ill-suited to the judicial process").

44

See id.; see also Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt.,
Inc., 325 F.Supp. 1049, 1061 (D.C. Cal. 197 1) (explaining the harms resulting from a "primary" boycott or
concerted refusal to deal).

39

40

of the Exchange and its members constituted a group
boycott that deprived petitioners of a valuable business and would have qualified as a per se violation of
§ I of the Sherman Act). Qualifying under the narrow
"Silver Exception" requires the following elements:
(I) a legislative mandate for self regulation "or otherwise"; (2) collective action intended to (a) accomplish an end consistent with the policy justifying selfregulation, (b) reasonably relate to that goal, and (c) no
more extensive than necessary; (3) procedural safeguards that assure the restraint is not arbitrary and
which furnishes a basis for judicial review. See Denver
Rockets, 325 F Supp. at 1064-65 (articulating the "Silver
Exception").

See Silver v. NewYork Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341,

359-65 (1963) (concluding the absence of procedural
safeguards (not providing notice or opportunity for a
hearing) contributed to the Exchange's antitrust violations, the Court explained that while traditional antitrust concepts under the Rule of Reason affords the
Exchange flexibility to carry out its statutory obligations, the antitrust laws also act as a check upon the
anticompetitive activities of the Exchange). For further application of this reasoning see Deesen v. Prof'l
Golfers' Ass'n of America, 358 F.2d 165, 170-72 (9th
Cir. 1966) (finding theAssociation's eligibility rules reasonably accomplished the designed purpose of maintaining a high quality of competition, the court concluded that excluding players for not meeting eligibility requirements did not violate § I of the Sherman
Act); but see Wash. State Bowling Proprietors Ass'n,
Inc. v. Pac. Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 1966)
(applying per se rule to invalidate a regulatory scheme
where no provision for a hearing comparable to that
in Deesen existed).
41See

Silver, 373 U.S. at 347-49 (explaining that absent
the applicable federal regulation, the collective action

-_5G0-

See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S.
717,723 (1988).
41

46

See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 69 1.

See Bd. of Trade of City if Chicago v. United States,
246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).

47

48

See id.

See Cont'l TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,
49 (1977) (explaining how years of "judicial gloss" on
the statutory language of section I of the Sherman Act
established the Rule of Reason as the prevailing standard of analysis).
49

50

The Supreme Court articulated the "nonstatutory"

labor exemption in Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.Jewel
Tea, 381 U.S. 676 (1965) (upholding the validity of
a union-negotiated provision limiting market operating hours, thereby limiting hours by which employers
could sell fresh meat). The plurality opinion authored
by Justice White and joined by Chief Justice Warren
and Justice Brennan, concluded that after weighing

Can'tWe PlayToo? The Legality of Excluding Preparatory Players from the NBA
the respective interests involved, national labor policy
places union-employer agreements involving mandatory subjects of bargaining beyond the reach of the
Sherman Act. Id. at 689-91. An opinion authored by
Justice Goldberg and joined by Justices Harlan and
Stewart, dissenting from the opinion but concurring
in its result, criticized the White plurality for refusing
to acknowledge congressional intent against judges
substituting their "economic and social policies for
free collective bargaining," advocating instead absolute immunity from the antitrust laws if the dispute
involves mandatory subjects of bargaining. Id. at 727.
In support of his reasoning, Justice Goldberg quoted
from United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232
(1941) (holding that if a union acts in its self-interest
and does not combine with non-labor groups,"the licit
and illicit ... are not to be distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of
the end of which the particular union activities are the
means"), reaffirmed in Allen Bradley Co. v. Union, 325
U.S. 797, 810-I I (1945). Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 705-06.
Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black and Clark,
authored a third opinion concurring in judgment. Id.
at 734-38 (focusing on the multi-employer bargaining
unit). This Note focuses on the White and Goldberg
opinions. See infra notes 182-87 and accompanying
text.
11 Sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act created a
"statutory" labor exemption, asserting a general public
policy favoring collective activity by employees and
protecting certain union tactics including strikes, boycotts, and other group actions from antitrust scrutiny.
See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 611 (1976); see also
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443,485
(1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (explaining how the
explicit "statutory" labor exemption reflects the view
that "Congress, not the judges.... should declare what
public policy ... the industrial struggle demands"). See
generally Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2000), Norris-LaGuardiaAct, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101- 115 (2000).
52

See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 23 I, 236-37

(I 996); see also American Fed'n of Musicians of United
States and Canada v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99, I10-11
(1968) (explaining that whether an agreement concerns a mandatory subject of bargaining depends not
on its form but on its practical effect). See generally
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW,

2272-98 (Patrick Hardin

& John E. Higgins, Jr. eds., 4 th ed. 2002); Kieran M.
Corcoran, When Does the Buzzer Sound?: The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1045 (1994); 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2000) (obliging
parties to bargain collectively over wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment).
11 See Brown, 518 U.S. at 242. See also Connell Constr.
Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local Union No. 100,
421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975) (warning that to hold the
ordinary,anti-competitive effects of collective bargaining in violation of antitrust laws renders the goals of
federal labor law unachievable).
For a recent Supreme Court decision applying the
nonstatutory labor exemption to professional sports
see Brown, 518 U.S. at 233-50 (Following impasse, prior
to which NFL team owners bargained with the players' union over salaries for "developmental squad"
players, the owners implemented the terms of their
own "last best bargaining offer" without consent of
the union. The Court held the implicit, nonstatutory
labor exemption shielded the owners' conduct from
antitrust liability. It reasoned that the conduct (I)
took place during and immediately following negotiations, (2) grew out of, and directly related to, lawful
operation of the bargaining process, (3) involved mandatory subjects of bargaining, and (4) only concerned
the parties to the collective bargaining relationship.).
14

11 "Professional sports leagues" include, for purposes
of this Note, the NBA, Major League Baseball ("MLB"),
the National Football League ("NFL"), the National
Hockey League ("NHL") and Major League Soccer
("MLS").
56

Multi-sport athletes present exceptions to this prop-

osition. However, one sport inevitably prevails as
physical and contractual demands diminish the value
of the dual endeavor. The exploits of Bo Jackson and
Deion Sanders, each competitors in MLB and the NFL,
illustrate this exception.
57 See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173,
II 78-79 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (referring to the NFL draft:
"[T]he NFL clubs which have 'combined' to implement
the draft are not Competitors in any economic sense.
The clubs operate basically as a joint venture in producing an entertainment product ...No NFL club can
produce this product without agreements and joint
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action with every other team ... These economic joint
venturers 'compete' on the playing field ...but ...
cooperation [off the field] is essential if the entertainment product is to attain a high quality: only if the
teams are 'competitively balanced' will spectator interest be maintained at a high pitch. No NFL team .
..is interested in driving another team out of business, whether in the counting-house or on the football
field, for if the League fails, no one team can survive");
accord Robertson v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 389 F Supp.
867, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (explaining: "Some degree of
economic cooperation which is inherently anti-competitive may well be essential for the survival of ostensibly competitive professional sports leagues. Without
these mechanisms unrestrained price wars for the service of the most proficient players will ensue ...
with
the wealthiest teams capturing the top talent and the
poorer teams facing demise due to the loss of fans
and profit.") (citations omitted), Philadelphia World
Hockey Club, Inc.v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351
F Supp. 462, 486 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (asserting: "In order
to be successful, a professional hockey league normally
must have some of the qualities of parity among its
member teams which make other sports successful.
That is, the public must believe that there is relative
parity among the member teams and that each team
has the opportunity of becoming a contender over
a reasonable cycle of years and a reasonable chance
of beating any other team on any given night"); but
cf Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F3d 47,
53-54, 56, 59, 61-62 (I st Cir. 2002) (recognizing that
other professional sports leagues do not exist as part
of an overarching corporate structure but rather as "a
confederation fused from agreements among preexisting, independently owned teams"); see Fraser v. Major
League Soccer, L.L.C., 97 F Supp. 2d 130, 138 n. 10 (D.
Mass. 2000) (explaining that a reasonable jury could
find that MLS existed as part of a broader market
and could thus conclude that MLS constituted a single
entity because, by owning and either operating or contracting with investors to assume operational responsibilities for individual teams, it resembled an "ordinary
company").
58

The "reserve clause," as applicable to professional

sports (including basketball, football and hockey) generally limited a player's bargaining position with its
team by precluding such athletes from negotiating with
other clubs at the conclusion of their contractual obligation. See GEORGE W, SCHUBERT ET AL., SPORTS LAW 124

(1986). Players could either enter into a new contract
with the same team in the succeeding year of the player's contract or refuse to play without compensation.
See id.; see also Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F
Supp. 420, 434 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (describing the "reserve
clause" as the gravamen of Federal Baseball's case).
19 See Fed. Baseball Clubs of Baltimore, Inc. v. Nat'l
League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208
(1922).
60

See id. at 209.

61

See id. (explaining: "That to which it is incident, the

exhibition, although made for money would not be
called trade or commerce in the commonly accepted
use of those words [because] personal effort, not
related to production, is not a subject of commerce.").
62

See Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953).

63

See id. at 357 (articulated in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S.

258,274 (1972)).
64

Flood v.Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).

65

Id. at 282 ("[B]aseball is, in a very distinct sense, an

exception and an anomaly:").
66

Id. at 285 (quoting Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357).

67 The

Curt Flood Act states, in pertinent part:
(a) [T]he conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons in the business of organized professional major league baseball directly relating to or
affecting employment of major league baseball players
to play baseball at the major league level are subject
to the antitrust laws to the same extent such conduct,
acts, practices, or agreements would be subject to the
antitrust laws if engaged in by persons in any other
professional sports business affecting interstate commerce.
(b) No court shall rely on the enactment of
this section as a basis for changing the application of
the antitrust laws to any conduct, acts, practices, or
agreements other than those set forth in subsection
(a).
15 U.S.C. § 27a (2000).
68 See generally J. Philip Calabrese, Recent Legislation:
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77 See,

sports operating interstate - football, boxing, baseball,
and, presumably, hockey and golf - are not so
exempt.").

e.g., Haywood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S.
1204 (1971); accord Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt.,
Inc., 325 F Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 197 1). See also, Phila.
World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Phila. Hockey Club, Inc.,
351 F Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Fraser v. Major League
Soccer, L.L.C., 97 F Supp. 2d 130 (D. Mass. 2000);
Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass'n,
Inc., 51 I F Supp. 1103 (D. Neb. 1981); Deesen v. Prof'l
Golfer's Ass'n, 358 F2d 165 ( 9 th Cir. 1966);Wash. State
Bowling Proprietors Ass'n v. Pac. Lanes, Inc., 356 U.S.
371 ( 9 th Cir. 1966); United States Trotting Ass'n, Inc. v.
Chicago Downs Ass'n, Inc., 665 F2d 781 (7th Cir. 198 1)
(horse racing).

71See

78

See Denver Rockets, 325 F Supp. at 1060.

79

Id.

Antitrust and Baseball, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 531 (1999)
(discussing the Curt Flood Act and its affect on Major
League Baseball's antitrust exemption).
69

But see Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 83 1 F Supp.

420, 436 (1993) (holding the exemption, as established in Federal Baseball, limited to baseball's "reserve
system").
70

See Flood, 407 U.S. at 282-83 ("Other professional

United States v. Int'l Boxing Club of New York,
Inc., 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
72

See id. at 243. Supporting its contention that grant-

ing exemptions from the antitrust laws lies within the
province of Congress, the Court referenced the failure to enact four bills introduced to Congress in 195 I
seeking to exempt all organized professional sports
from the antitrust laws. Id. A House Subcommittee
report explained, "such a broad exemption could not
be granted without substantially repealing the antitrust
laws." Id. at 244.
73 See United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (I 955).
74 See id. at 227-28. According to the Court, "[t]he

defendants would have us convert this narrow application of the rule [Toolson] into a sweeping grant of
immunity to every business based on the live presentation of local exhibitions, regardless of how extensive
its interstate phases may be .... If the Toolson holding
is to be expanded - or contracted - the appropriate
remedy lies with Congress." Id. at 230. See also Int'l
Boxing, 348 U.S. at 242 (referencing the Court's holding
in Shubert).
71 See Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S. 445

(1957).
76

See id. at 461 ("[W]e now specifically limit the rule

there established [in Federal Baseball and Toolson] to
the facts there involved, i.e., the business of organized
professional baseball. As long as the Congress continues to acquiesce we should adhere to - but not
exceed - the interpretation of the Act made in those
cases.").

80 Id.
81 See

id. The rescinded contract involved separate liti-

gation inconsequential to this Note.
82

See id.

83

See Haywood, 401 U.S. 1204 (affirming the prelim-

inary injunction issued by the district court). The
Court explained that should Haywood's suit succeed
[in Denver Rockets], not allowing him to play during
litigation subjects Haywood and his playing career to
irreparable harm as his conditioning, skill level, status
as a "super star," and other attributes common to
an athlete deteriorate. Id. at 1205. The Court further addressed the potential effects of the injunction
on the NBA, taking into account Seattle's interest in
Haywood's continued participation to enhance their
chances of qualifying for the playoffs, the absence of
injury should he participate and the team not make
the playoffs, and the potential action necessary should
Seattle make the playoffs in light of the NBA prevailing in the ensuing suit. Id. at 1206. For a discussion
regarding standards for a preliminary injunction see,
e.g., Linserman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F Supp.
1315, 1318-26 (D. Conn. 1977) (explaining analysis for
awarding a preliminary injunction in the Second Circuit).
84

See Denver Rockets, 325 F Supp. 1059-60 (citing NBA

By-Laws as of the 1970-71 season). The following provisions codified the rule:
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§ 2.05:A person who has not completed high
school or who has completed high school but
has not entered college, shall not be eligible to
be drafted or to be a Player until four years
after he has been graduated or four years after
his original high school class has been graduated ... nor may the future services of any
such person be negotiated or contracted for,
or otherwise reserved. Similarly, a person who
has entered college but is no longer enrolled,
shall not be eligible to be drafted or to be a
Player until the time when he would have first
become eligible had he remained enrolled in
college. Any negotiations or agreements with
any such person during such period shall be
null and void and shall confer no rights whatsoever; nor shall a Member violating the provisions of this paragraph be permitted to acquire
the rights to the services of such person at any
time thereafter.
§ 6.03: The following classes of persons shall
be eligible for the annual draft: (a) Students
in four year colleges whose classes are to be
graduated during the June following the holding of the draft; (b) Students in four year colleges whose original classes have already been
graduated, and who do not choose to exercise remaining collegiate basketball eligibility;
(c) Students in four year colleges whose original classes have already been graduated if such
students have no remaining collegiate basketball eligibility; (d) Persons who become eligible
pursuant to the provisions of Section 2.05 of
these By-laws.
Id. The ABA enforced a similar policy but allowed
for a "hardship exemption" that entitled Haywood
to enter the league when he did. Id. at 1060.

See id. (Recognizing that summary judgment frequently decides group boycott cases, the court
explained how the Supreme Court specifically mentioned group boycott cases as appropriate for resolution without trial) (citing White Motor Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 253, 260 (1963)). Summary judgment
is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law" Fed. R. Civ. R 56.
88

See Denver Rockets, 325 F.Supp. at 1066-67.

89

90 Id. at

106 1.

9' See id.
92

Id.

See id. (explaining how members of the combination
[NBA] must possess a market power approaching that
of a monopoly).
93

94 See Denver Rockets, 325 F Supp. at 1062.
9' See id.

See id. at 1063.

96

97 See id. at 1063-64.
See id. at 1064.

98

99 See id. at 1065.
100

Denver Rockets, 325 F Supp. at 1066.

101Id.

102 See id. (explaining that summary judgment for anti-

85 See id. at 1059; 15 U.S.C. § I (2000).

trust violations is appropriate where less restrictive
means are available).

86 See

103See id.

Denver Rockets, 325 F.Supp. at 1060. The disputed

sections took effect regardless of a potential players
desire, or eligibility,to attend college and to participate
in college athletics. Id. at 1060-6 I. Note the NBA ByLaws did not constitute an agreement reached through a
collective bargaining process. Id. at 1059-60.
87

See id.

104

See id. at 1067.

'1 See Scott R. Rosner, Must Kobe Come Out and Play?
An Analysis of the Legality of Preventing High School Athletes and College Underclassmen from Entering Professional Sports Drafts, 8 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 539, 553
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(1998) (describing the aftermath of the Spencer Haywood suit).

1,1 Mackey, 543 F2d at 615-17.

106

116

Id. at 615.

117

Id.

118

Id. at 616.

See id.

"07 See id.; see also NBA-NBPA Collective Bargaining
Agreement § 5(a), supra note 6.
108

For a similar outcome in professional hockey see

Linseman, 439 F.Supp. 1315 (wherein a nineteen-yearold plaintiff successfully challenged a league rule prohibiting persons under the age of twenty from playing
for any team within the league); but see Neeld v.
National Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979)
(holding an NHL bylaw rendering a player with one
eye ineligible to play for member clubs did not violate
federal antitrust law because its primary effect promoted safety).
109

1I0 See id. at 609, n. I. The Rozelle Rule effectively limited a player's ability to sign with a different team upon
expiration of his contractual obligation by requiring
the signing club to compensate the player's former
team.
III See id. at 609.
Id. at 612. In response to player allegations that

the clubs unilaterally imposed the Rozelle Rule, the
court evaluated the bargaining history between the
two groups and concluded that, despite the absence of
an explicit reference to the Rule, the agreement sufficiently incorporated the Rozelle Rule. Id. at 612-13.
13

Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615-17.

120

Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F2d 954,958 (2d

121

Cir. 1987).
122

Id.

123

Id. at 956,959. Wood's additional allegation that the

See Mackey, 543 F2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976) (reviewing

the decision of the district court, which held the
Rozelle Rule invalid under both the per se and Rule of
Reason analyses and further denied immunity to the
Rule under the nonstatutary labor exemption despite
its inclusion in a collective bargaining agreement).

112

Id. at 619 (concluding the unique nature of professional football rendered the per se illegality rule inappropriate).
''9

prohibition of player corporations violated the Sherman Act is not relevant to this Note. See id. Oscar
Robertson brought a similar antitrust suit against the
NBA in 1976. See Robertson v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n,
72 FR.D. 64 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 556 F2d 682 (2d Cir.
1976); 389 F.Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
124

Wood, 809 F2d at 956.

125

Id. at 962. Holding in favor of exemption, the lower

court applied the test articulated in Mackey, finding the
disputed provisions only affected parties to the collective bargaining agreement, that it involved mandatory
subject of bargaining, and that they resulted from bona
fide arms-length bargaining. See Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 602 F.Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
126

See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.

127

Id.

128

See Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v.Williams, 857 F Supp.

See id. at 613-14 (citing Connell Constr. Co., Inc. v.

Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100,421 U.S.
616; Amalgamated Meat Cutters & ButcherWorkmen
v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676; United Mine Workers v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (I 965).
,,4 Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615. But see Jewel Tea, 381
U.S. at 697-735 (Goldberg, J. dissenting) (advocating a
policy that exempts all mandatory subjects of bargaining from antitrust scrutiny).

1069, 1073 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (defining "college draft"
and "salary cap"). A college draft is a mechanism
by which teams select players entering [the NBA].
Weaker teams generally select first and participation
in the draft precludes a drafted player from negotiating with teams other than the team that selected him.
Id. A salary cap is a ceiling on the total amount a team
may spend on player salaries. Id. The recent success

SPORTS
of small market teams, such as the Sacramento Kings
and Minnesota Timberwolves of the NBA, illustrates
the effectiveness of such restraints in creating parity
among teams within a league.
129

See Wood, 809 F2d at 959.

'30 See id. at 961 (explaining:"lf Wood's antitrust claim
were to succeed, all of these commonplace arrangements would be subject to similar challenges, and federal labor policy would essentially collapse unless a
wholly unprincipled, judge made exception were created for professional athletes. Employers would have
no assurances that they could enter into any collective
bargaining agreement without exposing themselves to
an action for treble damages.").
...
See id. at 958; see also Wood, 602 F Supp. at 528
(applying the test devised in Mackey).
132

See Wood, 602 F Supp. at 528.

,'1See Wood, 809 F.2d at 960. Wood essentially argued
that because the NBPA could not address his interests during the course of negotiations, a consequence
of him not yet entering the league, he could not be
bound by the agreement. Id.
134

See id. (explaining how new employees in the

industrial context routinely find themselves disadvantaged to those already hired, with collective bargaining
agreements providing benefits governed by seniority,
such as salaries, layoffs, and promotions, despite knowing newer employees would fare better if allowed to
negotiate individually). There was no dispute over
whether the agreement arose out of bona fide armslength bargaining. See generally Wood, 602 F Supp. 525,
aff'd, 809 E2d 954.
"I See Williams, 857 F.Supp. at 1078-79 (explaining that
after finding the college draft and salary cap provisions of the collective bargaining agreement protected
under the nonstatutory exemption the court further
found, under Rule of Reason principles, a failure by the
players to show unreasonable anti-competitive effects
sufficient to outweigh the obvious pro-competitive
effect of the disputed restraints in maintaining a competitive balance). See generally Michael A. Carrier,
The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999
BYU L. REv. 1295 (1999) (describing pro and anticom-

-_5&6-

petitive effects of restraints in the context of Rule of
Reason analysis).
136

See supra notes 50-54 and 129-34 and accompany-

ing text.
13' Dan Wetzel, HowYoung isToo Young to Enter the NBA?,
CBS SPORTSLINE.COM, at http://cbs.sportsline.com/b/
page/pressbox/0, I 328,4200595,00.html (Aug. 16,200 I)
(on file with author) (last visited Sept. I I, 2002) (quoting NBA spokesman Brian Mclntyre:"lt is an iron-clad
rule ... It was collectively agreed upon, you can't take
it to court and overturn it, it's binding ... Someone can
take it to court, but they won't be successful.").
'38 N BA-NBPA Collective BargainingAgreement, § 5(a),
supra note 6.
139 For example, the NBA accepted senior Brandon
Miller, the twelfth man on his high school basketball
team, into the NBA draft. See generally Danny O'Neil,
From the end of the bench at Mercer Island to the
NBA?
Mercer Island Reserve applies for the NBA

draft,

SEATTLE TIMES,

June 5, 2002, available at

http:/

/archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/texis.cgi/
web/vortex/display?slug=millerOS&date=20020605&
query=Mercer+lsland+Brandon+Miller+NBA
(last
viewed 10/ 10/02). While Miller received minimal attention and was not drafted, the best high school player in
the country cannot be selected despite the attention
he receives and the talent he possesses.
140

See Marc Stein, Beaumont Junior Already has Fasci-

nated NBA Scouts,

THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS,

Jan. 7,

2002, at I B (listing all players who declared for the
draft out of high school since 1974, through 2001); see
also Julian Garcia, Prep Standouts Draft Big Dreams but
Most Not Ready for NBA, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 9, 2002,
at 81 (mentioning that NBA teams only selected one
of three high school entrants in the 2002 NBA draft).
141 Taj

McDavid, acting on delusions of grandeur, went

undrafted in 1996 despite advice suggesting he had virtually no chance at being drafted. See Bart Hubbuch,
Stern Wants Age Limit on NBA Draft, but Young Players

Show they Belong, THE

DALLAS MORNING NEWS,

July 21,

1999, at I B. Leon Smith, a rookie drafted out of high
school in 1999, displayed immaturity and a lack of discipline as he refused to perform drills requetsted by
Dallas Maverick's head coach Don Nelson during practice. See Mike Wise, 1999-2000 N.B.A. Preview: The

Can'tWe Play Too? The Legality of Excluding Preparatory Players from the NBA
West is Still the Best, N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 31, 1999, sec. 8
at pp. 2. Still others like Kwame Brown, selected first
overall in the 2001 draft, played few minutes leaving
many to question whether he made a wise decision to
forego college. See Steve Wyche, "Brown: I'm Just Going
to be Kwame", THE WASHINGTON POST, July 20, 2002, at
D4.
142

Steve Wyche, "Brown: I'm Just Going to be Kwame'"

THE WASHINGTON POST,

141

See generally supra notes 38-39 and accompaying
text.
113

Compare Denver Rockets, 325 F Supp. at 1061 (finding, without contest, the NBA possesses market power
approaching that of a shared monopoly), with Fraser,
284 E3d at 59 (explaining that a jury could reasonably
find that MLS's market power exists as part of a
broader market); see also supra note 57.
114

July 20,2002, at D4.
"I See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.

See supra notes 7-23 and accompanying text.

156

Id.

1441d

See, e.g., Haywood, 401 U.S. at 1205 (suggesting that
not allowing Haywood to play during litigation subjects
Haywood and his playing career to irreparable harm as
his conditioning, skill level, status as a "super star," and
other attributes common to an athlete deteriorate).
145

146

See supra notes 25-26.

147

See supra notes 37-39.

117 For a discussion of the college draft and salary cap,
see supra notes 12 I- 135 and accompanying text.

158

159 Mike Wise, 1999-2000 NBA Preview: The West is Still
the Best, N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 3 1, 1999, Sec. 8 at pp.2.
160

148

Unlike the NBA's unilaterally implemented four-

year college rule challenged by Haywood, the current
challenge would most likely be characterized as a conspiracy in restraint of trade, with team owners and
players acting in concert to preclude entrance into the
NBA by high school underclassmen.

See Denver Rockets, 325 F Supp. at 1066.

See Saunders v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 348 F Supp.

649 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (suggesting that failure to be
drafted does not give rise to a claim under the antitrust laws, particularly in light of a challenge by an
unqualified player).
161 See

Jackie MacMullan, Why Bother? Even if your Team

Gets a Stellar Player Like Tim Duncan in the NBA Draft,
it Probably Won't Make Any Difference in the Long Run,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,

149

See supra notes 85-104 and accompanying text.

110 See ContinentalTV, 433 U.S. at 49.

I" Mackey, 543 F.2d at 619 (concluding the unique
nature of the business of professional football, with no
club seeking to drive another out of business because
the success of one depends upon the survival of all,
renders it inappropriate to apply per se illegality); see
also Renee Grewe, Antitrust Law and the Less Restrictive
Alternatives Doctrine: A Case Study of Its Application in the
Sports Context, 9 SPORTS LAw.J. 227,230 (2002) (explaining how courts often recognize Rule of Reason as the
appropriate test in sports given the necessity of certain restraints in the sports marketplace).
512See

June 23, 1997, at 50 (describing how

the Minnesota Timberwolves carefully handled Kevin
Garnett upon his entry into the league by not showcasing him as the teams savior but rather by giving him
time to mature on and off the court).
162

Demographics for the 2002 NBA Draft selections:

22 seniors, 14 players from outside the United States,
19 college underclassmen, I junior college student, and
I high school senior. See 2002 NBA Draft Tracker, at
http://sports.espn.go.com/nbadraft/index. The Memphis
Grizzlies selected senior Shane Battier,the 2001 College
Player of theYear,with the sixth pick in the 2001 NBA
Draft, behind three high school players, one college
underclassman, and a twenty-one year old from Spain.
See 2001 NBA Draft Board, at http://www.nba.com/
draft200 I/draft board.html?now=TextNavBar.

supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
163
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See Denver Rockets, 325 F.Supp. at 1066.
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See supra notes 96- 104 and accompanying text.

179

See Fibreboard Paper, 379 U.S. at 221 n.6.

'65 See, e.g., Denver Rockets, 325 F Supp. at 1066 (addressing the NBA bylaw's failure to account for exceptional
circumstances).

180

See Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 691.

181

Hours would presumably become an issue only if

164

166

See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.

the age of a preparatory player required compliance
with child labor laws.

167

See Mackey, supra notes 109-120 and accompanying

182

text.
168

tices White and Goldberg).

See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text; see

also supra notes 123-38 and accompanying text (discussing the nonstatutory exemption in the context of
college draft and salary cap disputes).
169See
170

Wetzel, supra note 137.

Contingent upon the absence of any evidence sug-

gesting the contrary. See, e.g., Mackey, 543 F.2d at 616
(finding an absence of bona fide arm's-length bargaining).
171See Wood, 809

F2d at 96 1.

172

Id.

173

See supra notes 129-136 and accompanying text.

Id.; but see Pro Tect Management Corp. v.Worley,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14574, at *11 (S.D.N.Y 1990)
(explaining that "while new members of unions are
subject to negotiations made by their predecessors,
individuals not even yet eligible for the union cannot
be held to be subject to terms of that union's collective bargaining agreement").
174

175

See infra notes 183-85 and accompanying text; see

also supra note 50.
176

See Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 679-735 (opinions of Jus-

See Brown, 518 U.S. at 233-50.

183

involved, we think the national labor policy expressed
in the National Labor Relations Act places beyond
the reach of the Sherman Act union-employer agreements on when, as well as how long, employees must
work.").
184

See Carroll, 391 U.S. at 110-1I1; see also Jewel
Tea-e.g., prices or wages-but its relative impact on
the product market and the interests of union members.").

Id. at 692-93 (explaining, contrary to the Court's

findings, that if self-service markets could operate for
a few hours after 6 p.m., with neither an encroachment on butchers' work nor a substantial workload
increase during normal hours occurring, a challenge to
the restraint limiting market operating hours has considerable merit because the exclusion of self-service
stores from the evening market for meat would standalone, "unmitigated and unjustified by the vital interests of the union butchers," reducing the limitation
to an effort by the union to protect one group of
employers from competition by another - conduct not
exempt from the Sherman Act).
185

Id.

186

See id. at 697-735 (opinion of Justice Goldberg).

187

Id. at 727 (suggesting that Justice White's opinion,

by allowing judges to substitute their "economic and
social policies for free collective bargaining" flew in the
face of congressional intent).
188

177

See id. at 690-91 ("Weighing the respective interests

See, e.g., Connell Constr., 421 U.S. at 623 (exempting

direct market restraints from antitrust scrutiny only
when necessary to protect fundamental employee
interests).
See generally, Corcoran, supra note 30, at 1052.
190 Although certain veteran players are indispensable

189

See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. v. NLRB, 379 U.S.
203,222 (1964); NLRB v. Miller Brewing Co., 408 F.2d
12,14 (1969).
178

to the NBA, at least from a marketing standpoint, the
majority of veteran players impact the NBA's market-
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Can'tWe PlayToo? The Legality of Excluding Preparatory Players from the NBA
ing ability only to a minimal extent and may, in fact,
injure the NBA in that respect by keeping younger,
more exciting, and more talented players out of the
league.
"I'See Brown, 518 U.S. at 237 (explaining: "the implicit
exemption recognizes that, to give effect to federal
labor laws and policies and to allow meaningful collective bargaining to take place, some restraints on competition imposed through the bargaining process must
be shielded from antitrust sanctions"); id. at 242 (suggesting: "to permit antitrust liability here threatens to
introduce instability and uncertainty into the collective-bargaining process, for antitrust law often forbids
or discourages the kinds of joint discussion and behavior that the collective-bargaining process invites or
requires"); see also id. at 261 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(suggesting the Court has taken an approach akin
to the broad application of the nonstatutory labor
exemption advocated by Justice Goldberg in his Jewel
Tea opinion).
192

For example, a collective bargaining agreement may

provide legal justification for excluding athletes under
a certain age. See, e.g., NBA-NBPA Collective BargainingAgreement, supra note 6. A moral or societal argument may involve the importance in completing one's
high school education or may implicate the importance in developing one's level of physical and mental
maturity before entering such a demanding profession.
19 For example, Major League Baseball recently sanctioned the Cleveland Indians, fining them $50,000 and
shutting down their Venezuelan baseball operations
for two months, for signing an underage [I 5-year-old]
player in 1998. See Associated Press, Indians' Venezuelan Operation Will Close for Two Months (Feb. 28,
2002), available at http://espn.go.com/mlb/news/2002/
0228/1342369.html (on file with author) (last visited
Sept. 15, 2002).
See Associated Press, Tryon Shoot 66 to Earn
PGA Tour Card (Dec. 3, 2001), available at http://
sports.espn.go.com/golf/story?id= 1289181 (on file with
author) (last visited Sept. 15, 2002); see also Associated Press, Tryon's PGA Tour Adventure Begins in Phoenix
(Jan. 23, 2002), available at http://sports.espn.go.com/
golf/story?id= 1316300 (on file with author) (last visited Sept. 15, 2002).
194

In 1990, Jennifer Capriati emerged as a thirteenyear-old tennis phenom, reaching a then career high
ranking of six in the world. In 1992, she defeated Steffi
Graf to win the gold medal at the Barcelona Olympics.
However, personal difficulties and an arrest on drug
charges thwarted a promising career. After several
failed attempts, she completed a remarkable comeback and earned the number one ranking in women's
tennis, at age 23. See Associated Press, Capriati Earns
No. I Ranking, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2001, at SI; Doug
Smith, Resurgent Play Gives Capriati Reason to Smile,
U.S.A. TODAY, May 28, 1999, at C 13. For a profile of
Jennifer Capriati, see http://espn.go.com/tennis/s/wta/
profiles/capriati.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2002).
"1

196

See Mark Starr & Jean Seligmann, Introducing Tara, the

Youngest Ice Queen,
197

NEWSWEEK,

Mar. 3I, 1997, at 82.

Dominique Moceanu, became the youngest athlete

to qualify for the United States Junior National Team
at age ten and became the youngest athlete ever to
appear on the Wheaties cereal box. In 1998, at age
seventeen, she settled a lawsuit against her parents,
gaining financial and legal emancipation, in the context
of allegations that her parents squandered her earnings. See Carl Gaines, Independence Day for Gold Medal
Winner, NAT'L LAW J., Nov. 9,1998, at A23; see also Jodie
Morse, Vaulting into Discord: One ofAmerica's Top Female
Gymnasts Runs Away From Home and Sues Her Parents for
Divorce, TIME, Nov. 2,1998, at 80. For a profile of Dominique Moceanu, see http://www.usa-gymnastics.org/
athletes/bios/m/dmoceanu.html (last visited Sept. 15,
2002).
198 See Jason LaCanfora, A 12-Year-Old's Amazing Feat:
Soccer Prodigy Adu is Courted by Italy's Famed Inter Milan,
WASH. POST,

Aug. 25, 2001, at A I (noting: "Unlike

American professional sports teams, powerful European soccer clubs routinely attempt to acquire players
in their pre-teens so they can oversee their development, usually in team-run youth programs").
199 See Ken Davis, Heavy Pressure from the Outside, THE
HARTFORD COURANT,

Dec. 3 I, 2001 at C 10 (explaining

the existence of a 6-6, 225 13-year-old playing basketball in a New Jersey middle school good enough
to contribute to the success of some Division I colleges).
200
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Supra notes 7-23.
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20

NBA Commissioner David Stern strongly advo-

cates a 20-year old age limit. See Bart Hubbuch, Stern
Wants Age Limit on NBA Draft, but Young Players Show

they Belong,

THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS,

July 21, 1999,

at I B; see also John Thompson, Pro and Con of Permitting Teenage Pros in N.B.A.: The Coach; Value of Education Must be Considered, N..TIMES, May 13, 2001, § 8 at
I I (quoting John Thompson, former Georgetown basketball coach: "At the age of 13 I was big enough to
drive a car. I had the desire and the ability, but was
not allowed to drive ...
We establish minimum ages for
drinking, voting, smoking, marrying, renting a car, going
to the movies and working. We do this not based on
the individual but because of the larger needs of society.").
202

See William C. Rhoden, Sports of the Times: Making

the Big Leap Can be a Good Move, N.Y.TIMES, Feb. 9, 2002
at D2 (quoting Kwame Brown:"Right now LeBron has
his innocence; there's no innocence in this game ...
it's a business. Right now he's probably the man at his
high school. You go from being the man to being nothing, you don't matter. You get beat up in practice, you
probably won't get in the games.").
203

Ron Kroichick, An NBA Hopeful at 16 on Display

in Berkeley, S.F. CHRON., July 3 I, 200 1,at D I (quoting
Gloria James, LeBron's mother).
204

See Grant WahI, Ahead of His Class: Ohio High School

Junior Lebron James is So Good that He's Already Being

Mentioned as the Heir to Air Jordan,

SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,

Feb. 18, 2002, at 62.
205

See Prisbell, supra note 18; see also Barry Temkin,

Dazzling, then Writhing: Ohio Schoolboy LeBron James,
the Nation's Top Player and Blue-chip NBA Prospect, Goes
Down Hard, Sustaining a Wrist Injury in Classic at Julian,
THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE,June
206

9,2002, at C 13.

In fact, the NCAA recently relaxed its eligibility

rules in April 2002, allowing high school athletes to
enter the NBA draft but still attend and compete in
college provided they do not sign with a team or
agent. See Associated Press, Players Can be Drafted,
but Can't Sign with Team or Agent, (Apr. 25, 2002), available at http://msn.espn.go.com/ncb/news/2002/0425/
1374084.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2002).
207

See Doyel, supra note 8.
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